


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	THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	
	WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505	
National Intelligen	ace Officers 27 March 1979	25
MEMORANDU	M FOR: Director of Central Intelligence	
VIA	: Robert R. Bowie Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment	
	Richard Lehman National Intelligence Officer for Warning	
FROM	Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE	25
SUBJECT	: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE	
Summary		
about the exercise that it con China, a signification the secur decision the Tarak in Iran contendencies implication	analysts, meeting on 20 March, were particularly concerned unusual scope and multiple implications of the large Soviet on the Chinese border. While discounting the possibility could be intended as a screen for a planned surprise attack analysts thought it much more likely that the exercise was cant landmark in the long-term process of strengthening the esture on the border. The sudden decay of the strengthening the strengthening the strengthening the strengthening the strengthening the strengthening to rescue the regime. The growing assertiveness of Kurds and Azerbaydzhanis could lead the Soviets to covertly encourage such autonomous as by Iranian minorities. This could have particularly grave cons in the case of Iranian Azerbaydzhan, which adjoins the terbaydzhan republic.	25 25 25 25
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PRC in the event of such renewed fighting in the next few months.

- 2 TOP SECRET

27 March 1979

Approved For Release 2007/06/05 : CIA RDP83B01027R000300110052-9

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27 March 1979

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

taken by the USSR toward this war and the extent of Soviet involvement in support of the South Yemenis during the fighting remain somewhat

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ambiguous, and matters of some controversy within the community.	
Should the	2
fighting in fact at some point be renewed, intense collection efforts would be required to attempt to get a clearer fix on	
Soviet attitudes and behavior.	2
6. <u>Israel-Egypt</u> . Should the trend of Arab opinion in response to the treaty signing move strongly toward the rejectionist pole,	
the Soviets would be concerned as to how far to allow themselves to	
be moved away from their customary support of the Geneva conference.	
Any hints that the Soviets are weighing any such shift would be significant.	2
significant.	
	2
8. The Balkans. Yugoslavia	2
has placed some of its forces on partial alert in the last month, presuma	bly
in reaction to rumors about impending Soviet troop movements to Bulgaria	
and the possibility of Soviet-Bulgarian maneuvers there. While we still	
have no evidence to support such rumors, and they continue to appear unli	kely,
they cannot be totally dismissed.	

TOP SECRET 27 March 1979 Approved For Release 2007/06/05 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000300110052-9

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- 5 TOP SECRET

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